By Alison@Creekside
Despite Wednesday’s somewhat dampening headline, Pierre Poutine robocalls trail goes cold in Saskatchewan, the main story here is not that Elections Canada’s Al Mathews was unable to secure phone records from a proxy server company in Saskatchewan a whole freakin year after the fraudulent election calls were made.
No, the main story is:
Why did someone in the Guelph Con campaign — who would normally call RackNine to set up legit campaign robocalls directly via their Rogers IP — feel the need to use a proxy server to hide their ID at all?
Why did Guelph and Poutine both use the proxy server IP and the Rogers IP from the same computer to call RackNine for two days prior to the election?
Why did Guelph and Poutine both call RackNine from the same IP address via that proxy server exactly four minutes apart at four a.m. in the morning on election day? First Poutine, then Guelph deputy campaign manager Andrew Prescott.
Why is one of the three Constituency Information Management System reports downloaded by Andrew Prescott — phone numbers identifying supporters and non-supporters — now missing from the CIMS?
How did Poutine manage to crack the Guelph CIMS database in order to upload a list of 6,738 phone numbers to RackNine to send voters to the wrong polling stations?
And the biggie: Is Prescott, who has cancelled further interviews with Elections Canada, “Poutine” or is he being framed or is he merely the tip of a previously unsuspected and ongoing elections fraud iceberg in 200 ridings across Canada?
And so on and so on. The trail is not so much “cold” as overwhelming.
A Tale of a Boy and his TV Show is doing a breakdown of the RoboCon stories one by one. Good resource.
Enjoyed your post. LOON is featuring a related commentary on the robocalls “mystery” in our current post entitled, “Meet Andrew Prescott, the Conservative Christian who shared an IP address with Pierre Poutine”
justintoxicated : Not sure that would work. When I loaded my own IP into the link you provided, it located me in the middle of Vancouver instead of 35k away where I actually live.
There has already been talk about how the voip system used was tracked back to within a small area of where it would likely be located. pick one of a hundred sites that use google apis for geolocation and u can put in a site name or one of the ip addresses and bingo you know exactly where they are located. for example http://www.unlocktheinbox.com/locateip if you had the ip of the voip trunk you could just track it back with a tool like that one and then who can argue with you? sorry i get a little wound up about this..